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Digging the Channels of Inheritance: 








Theories of cultural evolution rest on the assumption that cultural inheritance is 
distinct from biological inheritance. Cultural and biological inheritance are two 
separate so-called channels of inheritance, two sub-systems of the sum total of 
developmental resources traveling in distinct ways between individual agents. 
This paper asks: what justifies this assumption? In reply, a philosophical account 
is offered that points at three related but distinct criteria that (taken together) 
make the distinction between cultural and biological inheritance not only 
precise but also justify it as real, i.e. as ontologically adequate. These three 
criteria are: (a) the autonomy of cultural change, (b) the near-decomposability 
of culture, and (c) differences in temporal order between cultural and biological 
inheritance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT’S AT ISSUE 
Inheritance consists in the production of similarities across generations of 
genealogically related organisms.1 Biological inheritance is standardly 
understood as based on molecular processes that are part of biological 
reproduction (i.e. the processes, actions, or sexual interactions that lead to new 
organisms).  
The concept of ‘cultural inheritance,’ as used in contemporary literature, 
is used in a similar but derivative manner – in order to compare the latter with 
the former. It thus also refers to (inter-)actions of organisms that causally 
contribute to the production of similarities between organisms. But these (inter-
)actions are independent of the biological processes involved in biological 
reproduction and in part also independent of the genealogical relatedness of the 
respective organisms. Traditionally (i.e. in the social sciences and the 
humanities), cultural inheritance is also known as social learning of ideas and 
behaviors.  
The assumption that cultural inheritance and biological inheritance are 
separate channels of inheritance, separate transmission systems which contribute 
to the similarities of organisms in populations in distinct ways, is fundamental 
in any theory of cultural evolution. It is, therefore, more or less taken for 
granted and is inscribed, often implicitly, in at least three traditions that 
theorize cultural evolution.2 Therefore, contemporary contributions to these 
traditions do not focus on justifying the basic assumption at issue in this paper. 
The focus is rather on spelling out the different kinds of social interactions and 
 
1 For details on this concept of inheritance, see Lamm (2018). I diverge from Lamm 
terminologically, in two senses. First, Lamm distinguishes between “inheritance systems” and 
“inheritance channels,” using the former for processes and the latter the way I do. The 
terminological choice to call the former “systems” is unconvincing since, as I will show, 
channels are nothing but systems. I use, as I think most authors do in the literature, ‘channel’ or 
‘system’ for the divide between biological and cultural inheritance. For the diversity of concrete 
processes that can lead to cultural inheritance, I use the term ‘transmission’. Second, Lamm 
assumes that inheritance is informational, while I rather follow the more nuanced account of 
Jablonka and Lamb (2005) which holds that some processes of inheritance might well be called 
informational, while others are not. Hence, you cannot put ‘informational’ into the definition of 
inheritance, as Lamm does.  
2 The three often run under the following labels: dual-inheritance theory, the epidemiological 
account of culture, and evolutionary epistemology. They form more or less separate lineages of 
theorizing about cultural evolution in the second half of the 20th century. They all take in some 
way or another Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman’s (1981) work into account. Boyd and Richerson 
(1985), Durham (1991) and Richerson and Boyd (2005) can be considered as classics of dual 
inheritance theory. Sperber’s (1996) epidemiological account of culture differs significantly in 
theoretical itinerary from dual inheritance theories. The third tradition, evolutionary 
epistemology, builds on Campbell’s (1960, and later) work on ‘blind variation and selective 
retention’. The literature on these three traditions has exploded in the last couple of years. 
Multiple encyclopaedia entries are now available on cultural evolution (e.g. Lewens 2018), 
sometimes biased towards one of the three traditions. Most of the authors of these partly 
separate traditions of theorizing cultural evolution involve the claim that cultural inheritance is 
distinct, but without a defence as detailed and multi-faceted as provided here.  
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structures that lead to cultural variation, patterns of cultural inheritance, and 
eventually cultural evolution (as in many of the papers in this volume).3 In 
other words, that the existence of separate channels of inheritance has today the 
epistemological status of a fundamental assumption means that it is rarely 
challenged from within (meaning, in this case, the three traditions of theorizing 
cultural evolution). It is taken as a fundament, a starting point, used to justify or 
do something else, e.g. used to specify certain dynamics of cultural variation. 
As a fundament it is quite important since it justifies that we can speak at all 
about cultural change as a distinct kind of evolution. After all, one could 
conceptualize culture and cultural change reductively, as part of biological 
evolution (and some have indeed done that), rather than postulating an extra, 
specifically cultural evolution. Whether or not something can be reduced to 
something else is an important and paradigmatic philosophical issue that can 
have impacts on scientific practice as well.4  
Thus, the question at issue in this paper is the following: is the 
separateness-claim just a way of looking at the world (i.e., a way of constructing 
theories and models that work) or does it point to something real? In other 
words, the question is: what justifies channelism? In reply, a philosophical 
account is offered that points at three related but distinct criteria that (taken 
together) make the separation of cultural and biological inheritance not only 
precise but also justify it as real, i.e. as ontologically adequate. These three 
criteria are: (a) the autonomy of cultural change, (b) the near-decomposability 
of culture, and (c) differences in temporal order between cultural and biological 
inheritance.  
Before I can explicate these three criteria, a few further remarks are 
important to prevent misunderstanding or misleading expectations. First, 
pointing to the fact that cultural inheritance happens via processes in the brain 
 
3 When the first steps in the direction of theorizing cultural evolution in relation to biological 
evolution were taken, around 100 years ago, this was certainly different. Anthropologists like 
Kroeber (see, for instance, his 1917 paper) had to first establish, intellectually and 
institutionally, the study of culture as an autonomous academic field, that can function 
independent of biological expertise. As a result, culture and cultural inheritance emerged as 
field-defining explananda, i.e. the very things to be explained by cultural anthropology, 
justifying the independent existence of the field at a time of its emergence. See Kronfeldner 
(2009) for that historical episode; see Section 3(a) for what is relevant from it for this article. 
4 Issues about reduction can impact scientific practice, for instance, in cases in which theories of 
cultural evolution (as one anonymous referee put it) “do not touch upon” the separateness 
(because it is implicitly assumed) and rather “just make assumptions” about “cultural 
inheritance (without bothering about genetics) and draw their conclusions from these 
assumptions.” After all, the ignoring of genetics derives from the implicit assumption of 
separateness. In short: explicit or implicit claims about non-reducibility often ground practices of 
ignoring. If, however, the issue of reduction is a matter of wording only, then it will very likely 
not make a difference for practice. I assume here, as the above-quoted anonymous referee 
implicitly does, that in the case at issue, the issue of reduction does make a difference in 
practice, a difference that distinguishes theories of cultural evolution from theories that do not 
treat culture as separate. An example for the latter is evolutionary psychology (e.g. as in Tooby 
and Cosmides 1992). See Kronfeldner (2017) on how they try to oppose theories of cultural 
evolution as wrongly ignoring biological differences.  
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while biological inheritance happens via processes in gametes will not suffice 
for the philosophical purposes at issue, since it would still not answer why we 
can regard the two channels as so separate that their separateness justifies talk 
of a dynamically independent cultural evolution.  
Second, to regard cultural evolution as separate from biological 
evolution does not mean that the two do not interact at the developmental and 
evolutionary level. Thus, this paper assumes, as most contemporary sources in 
the field, that only biological and cultural evolution taken together suffice to 
understand the evolutionary processes that we summarize under the label 
‘human life’. But since these interactions do not preclude the existence of 
cultural and biological inheritance as separate channels (and vice versa, the 
separateness does not exclude interaction), the two issues – justifying 
separation and justifying interaction – fall apart. This paper deals only with 
justifying separation.  
Third, for those who already believe in the separateness, the paper offers 
a detailed and systematic justification of their belief. For those who challenge 
the belief in separateness (usually from outside of theories of cultural 
evolution), this paper offers a forceful and systematic reply. Interestingly, the 
latest challenges do not relate to evolutionary psychology which reduces 
everything to a ‘long leash’ of the genes, as did their predecessor, sociobiology. 
The latest challenges regarding channelism come from holistic approaches that 
unify things in a non-reductive manner. These holistic approaches challenge 
channelism with respect to new insights regarding epigenetic inheritance, or 
from the perspective of developmental systems theory. Meloni (2016: 71), for 
instance, writes that epigenetic inheritance is a “key mechanism in blurring the 
demarcation between social and biological processes,” meaning cultural and 
biological inheritance. The most explicit attack against distinct channels of 
inheritance stems from Griffiths and Gray’s (1994, 2001) turn-of-the century 
version of developmental systems theory. “So-called channels,” Griffiths and 
Gray (2001: 196) claimed, are “not generally independent of one another.” That 
this explicit attack against channelism in Griffiths and Gray (1994, 2001) gave 
way to a silent indecisiveness is telling, but it is not resolving the issue. Griffiths 
and Gray (2004), for instance, implicitly use some concept of channels (and 
actually did so already while criticizing it in 2001). They do so by referring to 
“extragenetic inheritance” in contrast to “genetic inheritance.” Their usage of 
the label “extra-genetic” includes epigenetic inheritance (which is based on 
molecular processes that are part of biological reproduction) and cultural 
inheritance. It is thus not only unclear whether and how their picture allows 
them to distinguish between cultural and biological inheritance but – more 
importantly for this article – how they would justify that distinction.  
Finally, this paper focuses on culture as it occurs in human beings, 
without denying that culture exists (in the full sense of the term) at least to 
certain degrees in some other animals too.  
In sum: this paper presents a novel and systematic account of how to 
‘dig’ the channels of inheritance, that is: how to understand them in a precise and 
in-depth manner. To the best of my knowledge such an account is not existing 
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at the level of philosophical abstraction and precision envisioned here and thus 
fills a gap in the literature on foundations of theories of cultural evolution.5  
The to-be-defended core claim is the following: even though there is 
indeed a high degree of dependency between epigenetic transmission in 
relation to genetic transmission (after all, both belong to the set of molecular 
processes that explain biological reproduction), the dependency between the 
cultural channel in relation to the biological channel is vanishing in comparison to that. 
This is so, as I will show, since there are related but distinct dynamic 
independencies between cultural and biological inheritance that are crucial to 
understand the specifics of culture and cultural change. These are: (a) Cultures 
can (and often do) take-off, i.e. change without a concomitant populational 
change in biologically inherited developmental resources, (b) cultural 
inheritance is near-decomposable from biological inheritance, and (c) it lacks a 




2. MAIN EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF DEFENDING DIFFERENT CHANNELS 
AND MODES OF INHERITANCE 
The account defended here builds on allies, i.e. researchers who have already 
made some important steps into the terrain by delineating different kinds of 
transmissions within the respective channels. Many in the field will 
immediately think of the tripartite grid that allows one to distinguish between 
vertical, oblique and horizontal transmission modes of cultural inheritance. The 
vertical transmission mode runs from parents to offspring, while the oblique 
mode operates between genealogically unrelated individuals of different 
generations. The horizontal mode limits the latter to individuals of the same 
generation. This tripartite grid goes back to Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), 
the locus classicus of contemporary debates on gene-culture co-evolution. 
The common-sense view takes biological inheritance to be simply 
vertical. Hence, can’t we establish the difference between biological and 
cultural inheritance by pointing to the fact that culture is vertical and horizontal 
and oblique, i.e. not only vertical? Or by pointing to the fact that culture can 
change quicker than nature?6 Indeed, that is the basic idea usually at play and it 
will be utilized in this article too. Yet, the devil is (as always) in the details. 
Using the three modes to differentiate between cultural and biological 
inheritance is less straightforward than it seems at first glance since both 
cultural inheritance and biological inheritance can be vertical, oblique and 
horizontal, and both can be quick and slow. That is why the question arises: 
what, in fact, justifies regarding the two channels as distinct? I aim to show that 
 
5 What follows is already part of Kronfeldner (2018), although in a form dispersed across the 
Chapters of that book.  
6 See Lewens (2015: 91) who simply points at the difference between „swift“ horizontal cultural 
inheritance and „relatively slow“ biological inheritance to save „channel talk“. 
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it matters why a transmission mode is operative, whether the mode can be 
switched, and which proportions regarding the operative modes result from that. 
Looking at these details will be part of the solution to the question at issue in 
this paper. Before I can go there, two other accounts of distinguishing channels 
and transmission modes of inheritance need to be mentioned. They are the most 
detailed and most influential accounts available as of today, given the topic of 
this article, and are singled out because of that.  
Jablonka and Lamb (2005) distinguish between two qualitatively 
different kinds of transmission within the cultural channel (symbolic and 
behavioral transmission), and two analogous kinds within the biological 
channel (genetic and epigenetic transmission). For Jablonka and Lamb, 
symbolic cultural transmission and genetic transmission stand out since they 
involve, according to them, informational replicators, whereas behavioral 
cultural transmission and epigenetic transmission do not. Irrespective of 
whether that commitment to information and replication works out or not 
(which is irrelevant for the topic of this paper), their account does unfortunately 
not offer a detailed justification of the more basic divide between cultural and 
biological inheritance. They simply employ it in order to introduce the further 
distinctions involved in their account. The account presented here is thus meant 
as a complement to their model, but one that is neutral with respect to their 
claims about the special features of informational transmission.  
Equally consistent with the account developed here is Odling-Smee’s 
(2007, 2010) theory of niche inheritance. He distinguishes biological inheritance 
from niche inheritance by characterizing the first as direct transmission 
happening internal to the organism and the second as indirect transmission 
happening outside the respective organisms. The account I present in the 
following is not in opposition to his account since I take his account to entail 
that cultural inheritance is a case of external-to-the-body niche inheritance. It is 
distinct from pure ecological inheritance, which does not involve any social 
learning, but at the same time a crucial component of the broader category 
‘niche inheritance’ since it circumscribes “the primary means by which humans 
engage in the universal process of niche construction,” as Odling-Smee and 
Laland (2011: 220) write. Interestingly, Odling-Smee’s account assumes the 
body boundary as decisive for delineating direct-internal and indirect-external 
channels of inheritance. The account provided here is compatible with that but 
goes deeper: it does not assume the body boundary as a given; it rather 
provides a philosophical foundation for the used demarcation line between 
direct-internal biological inheritance (molecular, happening via processes in the 
gametes) and indirect-external cultural inheritance (ideational or behavioral, 
happening in the brain) by justifying the ontological internal-external dividing-
line dynamically. That dynamic picture takes the body boundary to be resulting 
from (b) near-decomposability. After all, what is philosophically decisive is not 
that the line is drawn at the body boundary but why that is justified.7 
 
7 Regarding the question whether cultural and ecological inheritance are so entangled that they 
cannot be separated, I will stay neutral. It is an issue that is as difficult as distinguishing 
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In sum, three existing accounts (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, Jablonka 
and Lamb, Odling-Smee and Laland) are in the background of what follows. 
Yet, they do not suffice to defend channelism against the challenges mentioned 
in Section 1. What is needed is an explicit and in-depth depiction of the 
independence(s) of cultural inheritance in relation to biological inheritance.  
 
3. A TRIPARTITE DEFENSE OF CHANNELISM: AUTONOMOUS CHANGE, 
NEAR-DECOMPOSABILITY, AND DIFFERENCES IN TEMPORAL ORDER 
(a) The take-off autonomy of cultural inheritance  
The first justification I offer for regarding cultural and biological inheritance as 
independent lies in the frequently mentioned autonomous change of culture. 
Even though culture can be very conservative (changing slowly), it can (if 
needed) change very quickly. If it does so, culture is like a fast track of 
evolution and changes without a concomitant change in the biologically inherited 
resources of the respective population. Change introduces variation in time, and 
over time that variation is visible also in space. Hence, the fact that culture can 
change without a concomitant change in biologically inherited resources 
explains why – over evolutionary and developmental time – culturally 
inherited developmental resources may vary in space and time (and often do 
so) even if the relevant biologically inherited developmental resources do not.8 
It follows that culture can take off and is in that sense ‘superorganic’: 
autonomously changing and varying. How that looks like over time, has been 
nicely depicted in a graph from Alfred L. Kroeber’s famous (1917) paper The 
Superorganic (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Culture taking off. The horizontal axis represents time and physical persistence, which is taken to 
not evolve at all. The vertical axis represents accumulation of changes (or increase in complexity even). 
Cultural evolution (the dotted line) is autonomously changing in relation to biological evolution (dashed 
line). B is the first animal using culture, while C denotes the beginning of our species and D the end of the 
 
between biological and cultural inheritance. It might well be that all three independencies 
utilized here would help for that question too, but whether they do or not is irrelevant for the 
claims made in this paper. See Odling-Smee and Laland (2011) for their take on the relationship 
between niche inheritance and culture.  
8 Note that culturally inherited resources can be as universally distributed as biologically 
inherited ones, and vice versa: biologically inherited resources can be as local as cultural 
resources, i.e. differentially distributed in time and space, without there being ‘races’ or 
essentialized cultures. The differential distribution of the biological foundations for lactose 
tolerance (a world-map of shadings of different frequencies, without clear borders) is a case in 
point and an example that will be utilized below for further points.   
 8 
nineteenth century. (Reprinted from Alfred L. Kroeber, “The Superorganic.” American Anthropologist 19, 
no. 2, 1917: 163–213, 211. Public domain.) 
 
 
As Kronfeldner (2009) explained, Kroeber’s account is built on an anti-
Lamarckian concept of inheritance which allows decoupling biological and 
cultural inheritance.9 After all, for a Lamarckian, who believes in the inheritance 
of acquired characteristics, biology (“inherited” in the Lamarckian dictum) and 
culture (“acquired” in that same dictum) always change together (small 
fluctuations ignored). For non-Lamarckians like Weismann and Kroeber, it was 
of utmost importance at the beginning of the 20th century to explicitly stress that 
culturally transmitted developmental resources can change (within and across 
generations, at the individual and at the populational level) without any 
concomitant change in those developmental resources that are transmitted via 
biological reproduction. This independence of change is the foundation for the 
take-off Kroeber so nicely depicted. Thus, the history of Neo-Darwinism, which 
opposes Lamarckian inheritance (which Darwin did not), is the history of 
channelism and with that it is the history of theories of cultural evolution. You 
can certainly find the seeds for that idea already in Darwin himself (e.g. when 
he refers to language evolution). Yet, only in Weismann and Kroeber, both 
attacking Herbert Spencer’s monist version of thinking about evolution in and 
outside of biology, can we find a detailed defense of an autonomously changing 
cultural channel of inheritance.10 
In part, the take-off autonomy certainly relies on the fact that culture is 
often functioning in a horizontal mode of inheritance. It can easily change 
quickly since it can spread independent of biological generations. It does not 
have to wait for a new generation of organisms. This will be taken up below 
again.  
Defending the take-off autonomy of culture, Dobzhansky (1956: 119) 
concluded that one cannot predict the course of culture from knowledge of 
biological developmental resources alone, “no matter how complete” that 
knowledge is. I will below add that it can also not be predicted from knowledge 
about the cultural channel existing as a separate one. Viewed from the outside, 
culture means caprice and that is its power too.   
Griffiths and Gray (2001, as quoted above) simply seem to ignore the 
take-off autonomy of culture, even though it is compatible with the 
interactionist consensus they rely on (i.e. that nature and culture interact at the 
level of development and at the level of evolution). For instance, autonomous 
changes of culture do not prevent that there are feedbacks between cultural 
evolution and biological evolution. Such feedbacks have been defended as part 
of gene-culture co-evolution theories, e.g. with respect to the evolution of 
lactose tolerance, probably the most paradigmatic example for gene-culture co-
 
9 See Kronfeldner (2007) for claiming that cultural evolution is not (in any interesting sense) 
Lamarckian.  
10 For details and references regarding Weismann and Spencer, see Kronfeldner (2009).  
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evolution.11 The story behind this example is the following: in some areas of 
Eurasia, people heavily relied on dairy farming, which spread first in the 
Levant then in Europe. When favorable mutations occurred (mainly the 
13910*T allele, given current evidence), some people became able to digest cow 
milk even as adults (which they weren’t till then). This, in turn, fostered dairy 
farming, which fostered the selection of the respective mutations for lactose 
digestion, and so on. This is coevolution, biology and culture interacting 
ontogenetically as well as phylogenetically, even though there are no genes for 
dairy farming and no Lamarckian inheritance, maybe not even epigenetic 
inheritance.  
Explanations of the evolution of lactose tolerance that include cultural 
inheritance (as a factor that determines the fitness landscape of the genetic 
factors involved) have been shown to better fit the available data than 
alternatives (e.g. the so-called calcium uptake hypothesis). In addition, given 
current state of the art, cultural inheritance of dairy farming practices took the 
lead in the co-evolutionary process. Evidence for that comes, for instance, from 
the pottery used for cheese making, which is now archaeologically studied to 
track the respective co-evolution. This means that for some time culture (dairy 
farming practices) changed without a concomitant change in biologically 
inherited developmental resources. Later, biology (the respective mutations) 
followed and the two spread more or less unisono, in harmonious gene-culture 
interaction, leading to co-evolution, each nudging the other on, but each still 
marching on its own, in its distinctive manners.  
To conclude: as long as culture can change independently from 
biologically inherited resources or can take the lead in co-evolutionary 
processes, cultural and biological inheritance are decoupled and make up two 
separate, evolutionarily relevant channels of inheritance. After all, autonomous 
change presupposes separateness, as Gray and Griffiths (2001, as quoted above) 
noted too, even though they did so in order to deny the separateness and 
independence of the channels.  
(b) Near-decomposability 
The discussed take-off autonomy is related to a second kind of independence, 
namely near-decomposability, which allows to establish the boundaries of the 
two different channels of inheritance as real but based on dynamic features, i.e. 
at the level of causal interactions. Merlin (2010: 209) provides the core clue: if 
there are specific channels of inheritance, then the “interactions among their 
respective own elements” should be “stronger than the interactions among 
elements belonging to different subsystems” (i.e. channels) of the overall 
inherited developmental system. Since Simon (1962), such cases of more-
interaction-within-than-between subsystems of a whole are called cases of “near-
decomposability”. The qualifier “near” is important. Full decomposition of a 
 
11 Aoki (1986) and Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza (1989) are seminal references for the case, 
developing the first models for it. See Gerbault et al. (2011) for an update on the case. Compare 
Lewens (2015: 86-93) who also refers to it as a paradigmatic case to understand how to refer to 
the channels of inheritance. Research on the case is still ongoing.  
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system would mean that the system actually has fallen apart. If, on the other 
hand, interaction within a discernable system is equally distributed, then the 
system is a whole but not decomposable. The ontological delineation of parts 
(sub-systems) becomes difficult if not impossible in such a case. It follows that 
only if there is near-decomposability in a system (some but not complete 
decomposability) can one safely draw ontological boundaries around parts of a 
bigger whole. And this is what helps for the case at issue here too. What needs 
to be shown is that there are near-decomposable channels (subsystems) of 
inheritance.  
Take the case of lactose tolerance again. How does the principle of near-
decomposability apply to the case? The dairy farmers in the Levant who 
changed – through their cultural practices – the prospects for the selection of 
the genetic change that made lactose tolerance in adults possible, had quite 
some daily interactions with each other: they raised the cattle, produced milk, 
produced and used the pottery that allowed them to store the milk and make 
cheese (which they were able to digest easier since it contains much less 
lactose); they also guarded the cheese from being stolen or getting rotten, and 
so on. Most of these interactions involved social learning mechanisms. At the 
same time, it is very unlikely that genetic factors (which made lactose tolerance 
biologically possible or impossible) made a causal difference for that daily 
business of dairy farming (from all we know so far). In addition, new styles 
(e.g. of how to make pottery to improve cheese making) might have spread 
quicker than the mutations that might have been around already. That means: 
people socially learned and enacted the practices connected to dairy farming 
thanks to a complex and high-frequency network of social interactions, while 
the mutations that showed up were initially not making any salient difference 
to these daily social interactions. And vice versa: it can also be assumed that the 
cultural practices had no direct developmental effect on the mutations 
themselves. This holds even though, to the best of my knowledge, it cannot yet 
be excluded that there were some epigenetic effects and even though on the 
evolutionary timescale (i.e. in the long run) the cultural practices made a 
difference for the spread of the mutation, which is precisely the point of the co-
evolutionary account. Finally, there might have been some developmental 
feedbacks and influences (e.g. via epigenetics), but compared to culture interacting 
with culture and genes interacting with genes, these cross-channel interactions 
were very likely negligible. It is thus safe to claim that the two channels have 
been near-decomposable, at least in the case at issue. Given all the above, it can 
be concluded that the principle of near-decomposability applies to the case at 
issue.  
Since the case is a paradigmatic case, one can extrapolate to other cases of 
co-evolution. It is thus justified to draw an ontological boundary between a 
biological and a cultural channel of inheritance whenever it can be assumed 
that there are more causal interactions within the system of learning and within 
the system of biological inheritance than between the two.  
A channel of inheritance, given the view defended here, is thus not a 
material entity. It is not a physical barrier preventing equally distributed 
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interaction of the elements, like a wall or tube, although it can certainly involve 
such physical barriers. A channel is a real pattern of causal interactions, a pattern 
of differential distribution of causal interactions that allows drawing a more-
within-than-between causal boundary between parts of a bigger whole.12 In the 
case at issue, it justifies drawing an ontological boundary where we usually 
draw it: at the body boundary. From that it follows that one channel of 
inheritance is internal to the bodies and based on molecular processes involved 
in biological reproduction, while the other is more ‘ephemeral’: external to the 
bodies, happening between people, known since ages as: culture based on the 
social learning of ideas and behaviors.  
To conclude: as long as it can safely be assumed that near-
decomposability applies, the distinction between cultural and biological 
inheritance is ontologically adequate – that is, cutting reality at one of its 
important joints.  
 
(c) Differences in stability-granting temporal order 
Over an evolutionary timescale, the two channels also differ in a third sense, a 
sense that stems from the more or less autonomous choices of the individual 
agents involved; a sense that leads to differences in temporal order, which 
amounts to differences in stability and in part explains differences in actual 
transmission dynamics. The term ‘temporal order’ refers to structural features 
that relate to the modes of inheritance (in Cavalli-Sforza’ and Feldman’s sense) 
which lead to differences regarding the stability that the channels provide for 
inheritance, i.e. the probability of long-term re-occurrence of the respective 
developmental resources across generations. It is an ‘order’ since it refers to 
structural features; it is ‘temporal’ since it influences dynamics over time.  
The to-be-defended claim is the following: the biological channel 
conveys – on average – much more stability than the cultural channel since the 
resources traveling within it normally cannot switch its vertical mode of 
inheritance, while in culture, individual agents decide which mode to use and 
do so based on the content of the to-be-inherited item at issue. This freedom to 
choose leads to the absence of a characteristic temporal order, which leads to less 
stability of the channel (compared to the biological channel), which explains (in 
part) the high degree of unpredictability of actual cultural transmission 
dynamics.  
As mentioned, vertical transmission runs from parents to offspring, 
while oblique and horizontal transmission is between genealogically unrelated 
individuals. Cavalli-Sforza (2000: 179-187) later refined this tripartite taxonomy 
 
12 Another example that illustrates this point is the existence of different departments in 
universities. One cannot just ‘see’ that universities have different departments by looking at 
physical entities (e.g. the buildings, the walls). One needs to ‘look’ at the people, i.e. their causal 
interactions, to discern parts of the whole. Only if the elements (members of the universities 
such as professors, staff, and students) interact more within individual departments than 
between different departments is it justified to conclude that there are in fact different 
departments of that university.  
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into a more fine-grained grid of four modes: a vertical mode plus three different 
kinds of horizontal modes of transmission, the latter distinguished according to 
the number of senders and receivers involved. If applied to cultural 
transmission, the following three horizontal modes are the result. First, there is 
a one-to-one communication mode, as in peer-to-peer social learning. Second, a 
magistral transmission mode, by contrast, is a one-to-many communication 
pattern, as in mass media or cases where an authority enforces a cultural item 
on a population via teaching, by decree, political pressure, or simply by 
network power (see Noebel et al., this volume). There is also, third, a concerted 
transmission mode which involves a many-to-one communication order, where a 
group of people exerts social pressure on a new member, as in religious cults 
and perhaps social media. All modes of cultural inheritance can be further 
divided into transmission processes that exhibit some bias (such as “copy-the-
best” or “copy-the-neighbor,” in which learning is biased towards certain 
senders, e.g. the best in the group, the richest in the group, or the closest 
neighbors). 
All these modes differ in terms of structure, i.e. the kind of change (how 
a new item in the population spreads). The actual dynamic (i.e. how quickly 
things change) depends on contextual factors and on four core interacting 
factors: the mentioned structural features, the rates of novelty occurring, the 
fidelity of transmission (frequency of copy-errors), and (last but not least) 
selective pressures.  
Vertical transmission is usually rather stable, i.e. slow and reliable and is 
so as a result of its temporal order (one-to-one, bound to biological 
generations), its low rate of novelty being introduced, and a relatively high 
fidelity of transmission. Yet, vertical transmission is less reliable than concerted 
and magistral transmission since the latter often have a still higher fidelity of 
transmission. Religions, for instance, usually travel a vertical or concerted 
transmission mode and show because of that a high stability over time. 
Magistral transmission, by contrast, is very handy for quick spread of novelty 
with a quite high fidelity, which is why it is used in schools and by 
governments. Yet it is usually less creative and can be still slower compared to 
peer-to-peer learning which has a comparatively low fidelity, a high rate of 
novelty, as fashion (dress codes) or any game of telephone illustrates.13  
As mentioned, the actual speed of change (evolution), depends on many 
factors, the four core ones mentioned above and contextual factors. As a result, 
actual transmission dynamics for concrete cases of evolution are quite 
complex.14 The following aims to show that the specificities of cultural 
 
13 The speediness of horizontal transmission is also why descriptions of some cultural items as 
‘spreading like viruses’ are so tempting, especially after 2020, when the world had to witness so 
forcefully that the horizontal transmission of the Covid-19 virus, leading to a history-making 
pandemic, so easily outperforms government decrees spreading in a too conservative magistral 
mode.  
14 For a book-length treatment of these complexities, see Morin (2015). The book is not oriented 
at distinguishing channels but at understanding, as the title says, “How traditions live and die.”  
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inheritance crucially (but not exclusively) derive from one peculiar and 
unfortunately often forgotten factor: the choices of individual agents.  
The argument rests on a claim made by Claidière and André (2012). They 
criticize the assumption that the temporal order and actual transmission 
dynamics in cultural inheritance are a result of different modes of transmission. 
They argue that it is just the other way round: the transmission modes (and 
thus the temporal order) are the result of transmission processes that are 
determined not by different modes (i.e. structural features) but by the content of 
what is transmitted and by the beliefs and preferences of the individual agents 
transmitting culture and thereby selecting cultural items. The beliefs and 
preferences operative in the choice (of sender and receiver) include beliefs and 
preferences about when to communicate or learn something and to or from 
whom.  
A core argument they use for this claim (and that is the decisive point for 
this paper as well) is that a cultural trait can change its mode of transmission from 
vertical to horizontal. Imagine the following: The availability of water changes, 
and you learned from your parents how to prepare potatoes by cooking them in 
water, and that is all you think one can do to potatoes to use them as food. 
Given the new evolutionary affordances, your friends, who in contrast to your 
parents quickly adapt to the new evolutionary affordance, successfully try to 
bake the potatoes in the oven, without using any water. You learn this new 
behavioral ‘technology’ from them. The actual content of the cultural item 
transmitted (ideas about how to prepare potatoes) and the evolutionary 
affordances (whether adaptation is quickly needed or not) determine whether it 
makes sense to do as your friends do or not. Thus the mode in which ideas and 
behaviors about how to prepare potatoes travel can change to fast track 
(horizontal transmission), leaving the ‘conservative’ security track (vertical 
transmission) behind. 
By contrast, biologically inherited resources normally cannot change their 
mode of transmission just because their ‘content’ in relation to evolutionary 
affordances would make that beneficial.15 Mitochondrial DNA is transmitted 
maternally, whatever it does in its context; nuclear DNA is (in sexually 
reproducing species) transmitted biparentally; methylation patterns are 
transmitted epigenetically; and other cellular resources are transmitted at the 
cellular level, etc.  
The mode of transmission in cases of biological inheritance is 
independent of the ‘content’ of the item being transmitted and thus is also 
independent of evolutionary affordances, at least for a very long time (since 
certainly the way these molecules are transmitted ultimately evolved as well 
and will further evolve in relation to evolutionary affordances). The mode of 
transmission in biological inheritance depends on the kind of molecule 
transmitted. It is mechanically fixed by the material constitution and the 
mechanisms of biochemical reactions that make inheritance possible for such a 
 
15 “Content” in the biological case is here interpreted functionally, as “what the resource does 
for the organism.”  
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kind of molecule.16 Finally, most of the mechanisms involved in biological 
inheritance are vertical, with the exception of lateral gene transfer, which rarely 
occurs for multicellular organisms (on current evidence).  
What follows from this for the task of delineating biological and cultural 
inheritance? Claidière and André (2012) have used the above to question the 
usefulness of distinguishing between different modes of inheritance within the 
channel of cultural inheritance. Yet, their argument can also be used to 
strengthen the divide between cultural and biological inheritance, namely as 
operating in distinct ways. If Claidière and André are right, and I believe they 
are, then there are two quite distinctive ways in which developmental resources 
can be transmitted over time: in a mostly content-independent manner 
(biology) and in a content-dependent manner (culture).  
On average, the difference between content-dependent and content-
independent transmission has important consequences for what I above called 
stability that the respective channel of inheritance promises. As indicated, a 
channel conveys stability if change is comparatively slow and transmission 
reliable. The claim that I want to put forward is this: the biological channel has 
a high-level of stability, determined by the structure of the molecules and the 
mechanisms of transmission, whereas cultural inheritance has no such pre-
determined stability.  
- The biological channel leads on average to much more stability since 
the resources traveling within it normally cannot switch their mode of 
inheritance and thus stay predominantly vertical, a mode that has a high 
fidelity and is characterized by slow change and thus can contribute 
high stability. This holds even though epigenetic inheritance does not 
exhibit high stability and functions more as a quick but reliable fine-
tuning mechanism within the biological channel, and even though there 
is some lateral (i.e. horizontal or oblique) gene transfer. The decisive 
point for the overall channel is the proportions and the vertical mode 
simply dominates ‘the show’. 
- Culture, by contrast, is normally so dependent on the choices of agents 
who react to the contents of culture and the respective context-
dependent affordances that – on average – it is much freer, less predictable 
and less secure in terms of stability over time, even where fidelity (no 
copying mistakes made) is high.  
 
16 Viruses are a notable exception for this claim about ‘fixed’ modes of biological inheritance. As 
Isabella Sarto-Jackson (personal communication) remarked, with reference to Pellett et al (2012): 
sometimes genetic factors can indeed be regarded as switching modes of inheritance. For 
instance, herpes viruses can be transmitted vertically (by biological reproduction, from a parent 
to descendants) as well as horizontally to another adult, and even at the same time. But note 
that in order to really be analogous to the cultural case, the switch needs to happen in response to 
new evolutionary affordances, and it needs to be reversible to count as equally content-
dependent. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether that applies to the case. 
An anonymous referee has pointed to the fact that for viruses it can indeed happen in a 
responsive and reversible manner, giving further credence to a by now standard comparison of 
ideas and viruses.  
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Viewed from the outside, culture is pure caprice: it can have high stability and it 
cannot. The channel itself does not allow for any predictions of the probability 
of reoccurrence of the developmental resources that travel through this channel. 
Hence predicting actual cultural transmission dynamics is much harder than 
predicting transmission dynamics in biological inheritance.  
The freedom of choice about what to transmit (send) and what to learn 
(receive) leads to a pattern that looks like caprice if viewed from outside. That 
caprice is built into cultural inheritance, at least for humans and other animals, 
and it is the crucial difference between cultural and biological evolution. That 
crucial difference also goes, traditionally, by the name of ‘freedom’ and 
grounds (a) the take-off autonomy, as well as (b) the near-decomposability, and 
(c) the peculiar absence of a temporal order in cultural inheritance, since it 
provides the splendid flexible stability that makes a full-blown cumulative 
culture such a powerful evolutionary force, so powerful that many believe that 
it ‘made us human’. I will say more in Section 4 on the relationship between 
choice and (a)-(c); before I go there, let me illustrate the ‘caprice’ I mean a bit 
more.  
Danchin et al. (2011) distinguish between genetic, epigenetic, parental, 
ecological, and cultural transmission. They graphically characterize the 
temporal order of the different channels that they distinguish by pointing to 
vertical versus non-vertical transmission modes (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Channels of transmission. The channels of inheritance are characterized as vertical, horizontal and 
oblique transmission modes, represented as arrows pointing vertically, obliquely to the right, and 
horizontally to the right. (Reprinted with permission from Springer Nature: Nature Review Genetics; 
Danchin, Étienne, Anne Charmantier, Frances A. Champagne, Alex Mesoudi, Benoit Pujol, and Simon 
Blanchet. 2011. “Beyond DNA: Integrating Inclusive Inheritance into an Extended Theory of Evolution.” 
Nature Reviews Genetics 12 (7): 475–86, p. 481), Copyright ©: Macmillan Publishers Limited (2011). 
 
Even given lateral gene transfer (the two small arrows in the field of genetic 
inheritance in Figure 2), the figure illustrates that cultural inheritance is quite 
peculiar in terms of its temporal order since simply no transmission mode 
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dominates.17 Above, I described the fact that ‘no mode dominates’ as the absence 
of temporal order. One can certainly also interpret it as a special kind of order, 
as anarchism can be counted as a special kind of political order, despite the 
absence of hierarchies. Whether it is interpreted as absence of order or as a quite 
unusual kind of order does not matter much since it does not impact the 
substantial issues involved. Hence, I prefer to stay neutral with respect to that 
interpretative issue, even though I utilized the language of ‘absence’. What is 
important is rather how to explain what I call ‘absence of temporal order’ or 
‘caprice’.  
With Claidière and André (2012), one can explain it very aptly. In 
cultural inheritance, no mode dominates since transmission is content-
dependent. Mode of transmission thus can change at any time, not just from 
one cultural domain to another (e.g. from religion to fashion) but also for a 
particular cultural trait (e.g. how potatoes are prepared; how milk is used). The 
actual transmission dynamic, in the end, depends on lots of contextual 
variables, since these influence the agent in the choice that determines whether 
transmission will be vertical, horizontal, or oblique, whether novelty comes 
easily, and also whether transmission is characterized by high fidelity.   
The fact that biologically inherited resources are bound to a mostly 
vertical mode of transmission is one of the reasons why the biological channel is 
regarded as characterized by, on average, higher stability. Once genetic factors 
(e.g. the 13910*T allele that explains lactose tolerance in European populations) 
are in a genetic lineage, there is nothing in the ‘mechanics’ of the channel that 
prevents them from staying there, virtually forever. (That there can be 
mutations and that they can be selected against is another matter.) The addition 
‘on average’ is certainly important since epigenetic inheritance is rather 
unstable and there is lateral gene transfer. The important difference is, as 
mentioned, one of proportions. In biological inheritance (at least for animals) 
the vertical mode dominates and in culture it does not – because of the freedom of 
the agents to choose.18  
 
17 The figure has one glitch: it classifies parental effects as cases of inheritance. Although 
parental effects influence gene expression and although they can be inherited, they are not qua 
being parental a case of inheritance, as Merlin (2017) argues. What parental effects qua parental 
effects are doing is introducing novelty into the next generation’s somatic line. This novelty can 
be adaptive but it does not have to be, and it can be epigenetically inherited to the still next 
generation but it does not have to. 
18 This helps to answer a worry that Buskell (2019) raised with respect to the claims defended 
here, and first stated in Kronfeldner (2018). He pointed to Heyes (2018) showing that there are 
important cases of culture being very stable and thus evolutionarily very important. That is 
certainly true (and important), but in and of itself it does not change the proportions of modes 
operative in cultural inheritance. In other words, pointing to such cases is not sufficient to show 
that, overall, cultural inheritance is as stable as biological inheritance or that cultural 
inheritance, overall, is dominated (as biological inheritance) by a vertical mode. Having said 
that, it needs to be mentioned that Buskell (2019) also raised the issue of whether this difference 
in temporal order grounds differences in ‘explanatory importance’ of the two channels as 
discussed in Kronfeldner (2018). Since explanatory importance depends on the explanandum at 
issue and the kind of explanation targeted thereby, a reply to that issue goes beyond the scope 
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With this it becomes explainable why culture can take-off and even why 
it has evolved: because it can change quickly if necessary. Certainly, as 
mentioned, culture can also be quite conservative (e.g. if it is vertical) but, as 
discussed above, it is at the same time unique in being nonetheless the perfect 
fast track of evolution. Jablonka and Lamb (2005: 298) therefore speak of culture 
as being in “the driver’s seat.” That is even the point of culture: it is the function 
of the genetic mode in the evolution of multicellular organisms to have high 
stability: biology “keeps the books”, while culture is in “the driver’s seat”. The 
genetic mode does not allow for a similar fast-track mode and the resulting 
flexible but potentially stable changes everyone knows and admires from 
culture.  
The decisive point is, as mentioned, that what cultural transmission 
looks like depends a lot on the content and the context (and that includes the 
choices of the individuals involved). The channel allows for all kinds of 
dynamics since it is flexible and stable. The trajectory of culture is thus, to 
repeat, not predictable from the channel itself; the trajectory of biology is, by 
contrast, much easier to predict (compared to culture at least).  
To conclude: If there are processes that differ so much in temporal order 
as do biological and cultural inheritance, then they should be regarded as 
separate and independent in that sense.  
 
4. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE THREE INDEPENDENCIES 
Since the lack of temporal order in culture is to a great extent, if not completely, 
derivable from the importance of choices of individual agents, and since quick 
changes will often be based on non-vertical modes of inheritance, the lack of 
temporal order grounds and facilitates (a) the take-off autonomy, as well as (b) 
near-decomposability. In other words, both (a) the take-off autonomy and (b) 
near-decomposability stem from culture being able to change more quickly (if 
necessary) by going horizontal or oblique, which equals (c) the absence of a pre-
set temporal order. If necessary, we choose to diverge from what we learned 
from parents (neither drinking milk, nor making cheese) and adopt new habits 
(making cheese; drinking milk) if we think these new habits pay off, i.e. help to 
adapt quickly to new challenges or opportunities.  
Thus, at the core of all three independencies lies our good old ‘freedom’: 
the ability to introduce new ideas or behaviors (independent of a concomitant 
novelty in biologically transmitted developmental resources) and the ability to 
choose – what to communicate and learn, when and to or from whom. The 
ability to innovate and to choose as one thinks right are the cognitive 
mechanisms that evolved to allow for the ‘events’ (i.e. the causal interactions) 
that make up culture and make it so special.  
It is important to note that (a), (b) and (c) are nonetheless distinct. Even 
though (a) take-off autonomy requires quite some (b) decomposability so that 
 
of this paper and thus has to wait for another occasion. Yet, I wanted to take the opportunity to 
say: point taken.   
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the parts can develop independently, there can be (b) near-decomposability 
without any long-term (a) take-off happening, as in the case of lactose tolerance, 
in which nature and culture changed in a dependent but near-decomposable 
manner. Also, (a) and (b) could exist even if culture were fully bound, let’s 
imagine, to a horizontal mode only (and the choices characteristic of it). 
Imagine a case of a biological life form, where biological generations (and the 
family bonding and social hierarchies that characterize vertical or oblique 
transmission) do not exist. In addition, imagine that magistral and concerted 
transmission are somehow cognitively disabled, so that there is horizontal one-
to-one transmission only. As long as choices are made (about when and what to 
learn from whom) and independent of any respective ‘genetic’ determinants, (a) 
and (b) can still occur, even though there is, in this fictional life form, (c) a fixed 
temporal order, namely the one resulting from horizontal transmission as the 
one and only available mode of cultural inheritance.   
 
SUMMARY  
This paper has provided three reasons for regarding cultural and biological 
inheritance (as they occur in human life) as separate channels of inheritance. 
The argument from take-off autonomy states that the cultural inheritance 
channel is decoupled from biological inheritance, i.e. the transmission and thus 
population-level distribution of cultural resources can change and vary without 
a concomitant change or variation in biologically transmitted developmental 
resources. The argument from near-decomposability shows that biological 
reproduction and learning build empirically discernible channels of inheritance. 
Distinguishing channels is thus ontologically adequate. The argument from 
temporal order states that – even though both the biological and the cultural 
channel can be vertical, oblique and horizontal – cultural transmission is 
content-dependent and because of that quite peculiar – capricious – in terms of 
the stability it conveys since there is a lack of temporal order (no mode 
dominates). As part of that, the power of choice emerged as the foundation for 
all three independencies: take-off autonomy, near-decomposability, and the 
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